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ENSURING TRUSTWORTHINESS OF INCIDENT EVIDENCE DATA GENERATED 
BY THINGS 
 







Techniques are provided that leverage blockchain technology to ensure that 
evidence that is recorded by things of an incident is saved and shared with interested parties 
in a method that ensures the trustworthiness of the evidence data. A thing, a local fog router, 
or a central integrity service might save evidence trustworthiness data to a blockchain. 
Complementary methods are also provided that bolster the solution’s applicability to 
connected cities and other implementation opportunities. 
 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
Things (e.g., vehicles, traffic lights, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), rolling 
robots, caregiver robots, security cameras, etc.) have sensor capabilities and many of them 
are constantly active and recording. However, many have a limited amount of memory to 
save data recordings. These devices typically have some form of a rolling buffer which 
contains data for a predetermined amount of time. If some incident occurs, like a car 
accident, it is very important that all available sensor evidence from all available devices 
be saved to help investigate the incident for legal and technological reasons. This becomes 
the collection of facts around the time of the incident.  
But providing the evidence is useless if the data cannot be trusted. The evidence 
must not be modified. The information cannot hold up in court if there is a dispute about 
what happened. 
As described herein, multiple devices (owned by different entities) observe/record 
an incident to upload their data to a plethora of places, while also maintaining an open and 
trustworthy record of the request, the actual data, and where that data was stored. For 
example, a device that records evidence data (e.g., a camera on a street light, a dash-cam, 
etc.) can respond to a request for evidence data by uploading their saved evidence 
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information to a location of their choosing. For instance, in the event of a crash, a driver’s 
smart devices may upload their data to the data stores of the driver’s insurance company, 
while the street light might upload data to the municipality’s servers. A record of this 
request, the location of where the data is stored, and a hash of the data may be recorded in 
an evidentiary blockchain specified by the beacon. This allows multiple parties to verify 
the request and the source, as well as validate that the data has been unaltered. 
Upon receiving a beacon request for evidence data about an event, things may then 
upload the relevant evidence data they have to a specific location. The authenticity of the 
data (e.g., timestamps, the device that generated the data, the evidence data itself, etc.) is 
ensured by the thing that generated the data writing metadata (including a hash of the data) 
to a public blockchain. 
The uploaded data may optionally have a header or marking set on the traffic, 
thereby indicating to intermediary devices (e.g., devices on path from the device to the 
secured upload location such as routers, etc.) that they should update the blockchain as well. 
This indicates that they received and passed on the data.  
In addition, or in a complementary fashion, a local fog device may receive the 
evidence data on behalf of the device and write it to the blockchain. The local fog device 
may broadcast the beacon requesting data. It may also relay the request for data to other 
beacons, allowing for the request for data to propagate throughout a connected city, for 
example.  
The beaconing device that requests the data may be itself provisioned on the 
blockchain to help ensure the integrity of the request for data. This prevents malicious data 
requests (e.g., from unauthorized parties). Evidence for the same incident provided by 
different sources is consolidated by a central service that de-duplicates and weaves the 
evidence together to tell the story of what occurred and from different perspectives. 
In a first example method, things that generate evidence save evidence authenticity 
information to the blockchain. When the beacon is announced requesting evidence, along 
with the metadata about the evidence request (type/time/location), the beacon includes the 
location of where to store this information on a blockchain for this event. In some instances 
this may be provided by the municipality in which the event took place (e.g., a smart city). 
If the device that receives the beacon is capable, it may directly write authenticity 
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information to the blockchain. The data stored within the block may include an assortment 
of metadata about the evidence provided. Some examples may include the file type, size, 
date, and hash of the data being saved. By writing this data to the blockchain, the act of 
uploading the data is immutably logged along with key characteristics of that data. By also 
providing information about where to access this data, individuals with authority to access 
the data can obtain it as legally allowed. 
Figure 1 below illustrates the first example method. 
 
Figure 1 
In a second example method, a central upload location acts as an integrity service 
by writing evidence authenticity information to the blockchain. In this situation, the device 
that receives the beacon has uploaded the data to its predetermined upload location. As part 
of that upload, the information about the beacon request, such as the event chain location, 
is also provided. In order to maintain the recorded chain of custody, the receiving server 
also writes data about the acquired evidence to the specific chain. The data stored within 
the block may include an assortment of metadata about the evidence provided including 
data about the device that provided that data. In addition to attributes similar to that 
mentioned in the first example method, key aspects of the device is logged such as the 
Internet Protocol (IP) address, serial number, Unique Identifier (UID), timestamp of data 
request, who made the data request, information on where that data was sent (the server) 
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with timestamp information, etc. By writing this to the blockchain, the act of uploading the 
data is immutably logged as well as key characteristics of that data and its provider. 
In addition, if there are multiple pieces of data being recorded to this blockchain 
for this event, the central upload location can also write additional metadata about the data 
it receives such as records of duplicate data, the rate of data, and/or diversity of the data 
(e.g., videos, audio files, photos, etc.). This central upload system may also leverage 
different algorithms and systems to derive an order of events that helps tell the story of 
what happened around a given event. 
Figure 2 below illustrates the second example method. 
 
Figure 2 
In a third example method, a local fog device receives the evidence and saves the 
authenticity information to the blockchain. In situations where the evidence generating 
devices report back to other nodes (such as city wide security cameras connecting to fog 
routers), upon receipt of the beacon those local fog devices re-broadcast the beacon 
requesting data to nearby evidence gathering devices, effectively relaying the request for 
data to other devices, allowing for the request for data to propagate throughout a connected 
city, for example. As they handle actions related to the beacon (such as uploading data on 
behalf of the connected device, or relaying the broadcast beacon), these devices write to 
the provided blockchain information about what they do and the handled data. Fog devices 
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may perform localized analysis of data to discard unneeded data. For example, if the 
request was to capture a red car during a time period, and that beacon was sent to every 
traffic camera in a geographical area, then the local fog router could request that data from 
every camera. Only the cloud service (and blockchain) data which matches the request may 
be sent in which a red car is spotted in the video footage. 
Figure 3 below illustrates the third example method. 
 
Figure 3 
The beaconing device that requests the data may be provisioned on the blockchain 
to help ensure the integrity of the request for data. This prevents malicious data requests 
(e.g., from unauthorized parties). 
This solution derives a significant and unique benefit from incorporating 
blockchain technologies. Blockchain is critical because it removes the need to trust any 
one party. In this case, the data in question can be highly valuable and can be both created 
and stored by many different parties. The data is used to drive large financial decisions 
(e.g., insurance, city design, traffic management, etc.) and it may also be used during civil 
or criminal prosecutions. All of this added together means that there is both opportunity 
and, in some cases, a large incentive to falsify the data after it is created (e.g., from private 
companies).  
One solution to this trust problem is to use blockchain technology. Effectively, 
rather than any one company owning the data, it may be widely published to many entities. 
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This demonstrates the immutability of blockchain: because everyone knows what the data 
is, no one party can change it. 
Additionally, blockchain is also uniquely suited to solving this problem because of 
the element of time. In many cases, the fact that data on a blockchain is immutable does 
not really help, because there is no way to prove the quality of the data in the first place 
when it was put on the chain. If false data is uploaded to a blockchain, all the blockchain 
can do is make that false data immutable. However, applied to the techniques described 
herein, that lock into time is a significant advantage. This disclosure targets events such as 
car crashes that are by their nature unexpected. That means nearly all tampering and 
removal of data is expected to occur after the incident. In the moment of an incident, there 
is no time to track down all sensors and cameras in an attempt to alter data, and then a 
second later all that data is locked into that moment of the blockchain, and it becomes 
immutable. Effectively, the nature of the problem to be solved removes one of blockchain’s 
greatest vulnerabilities. 
Finally, by using blockchain, the burden of proving legal access rights to the data 
at the moment of generation is removed. This means that new and larger quantities of data 
may be both available and trustworthy. In one example, a crime is committed and only a 
private camera captures the event. At the time of the crime, the city might request access 
to the video recording, but the owner may refuse on privacy grounds. This means that the 
city has to obtain a warrant and spend time figuring out whether they have a legal right to 
the data. That time gap is a hole in the chain of custody, where the data may be altered or 
destroyed (due to being overwritten). However, with the blockchain solution, that video 
system may save a copy of the video locally or a location controlled by the private party, 
and send a hash of the video to the blockchain. That effectively locks the contents from 
undetected alteration, because if the video is altered the hash would change and no longer 
match the immutable hash on the blockchain. This gives the city the time they need to 
resolve the legal questions surrounding access to the data. If the city does obtain access, 
when the prosecutor views the video they will be able to check that the hash matches, and 
have proof that the video is unaltered. This may open the door to a whole new level of 
trusted access to data for the city. 
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Today, when a traffic accident or other disturbance occurs, city police may be 
dispatched to the scene. They may canvas the area and ask for eyewitness accounts. They 
might also identify any nearby cameras, and collect the recordings manually, if they can. 
The city is then legally responsible for maintaining the chain of custody of that evidence. 
This may be a resource intensive and costly exercise, as all the data collected must be 
accounted for and protected every moment. This process may be virtualized and allow the 
smart city offering to include the ability to both collect and guarantee the authenticity and 
chain of custody for all data. With this solution, all data can be generated and stored as 
normal, either on private or public servers. When accessing the data later, regardless of 
where it is stored, the city can have assurance that it has not been altered because the hashes 
on the public blockchain match. By simplifying the chain of custody process, and by 
opening up the possibility for data to be stored on private servers in a legally trustworthy 
way, costs for the city are reduced and new data opportunities become available. 
For maximum effectiveness of the solution, the data may be added to the blockchain 
as close as possible to the moment of its creation. Ideally that means each device should 
write its own data to the blockchain. However, most of the devices do not have the required 
onboard compute power and flexibility to implement a system like this. Therefore, the next 
best option is to write the data to the blockchain the moment it leaves the device. When 
data leaves the device, it first touches the network. Therefore, the network itself is the best 
place for this solution to exist. Furthermore, by building the solution on the network, rather 
than on millions of different kinds of devices, a cost-effective and simple solution may be 
provided at a city level. 
In summary, techniques are provided that leverage blockchain technology to ensure 
that evidence that is recorded by things of an incident is saved and shared with interested 
parties in a method that ensures the trustworthiness of the evidence data. A thing, a local 
fog router, or a central integrity service might save evidence trustworthiness data to a 
blockchain. Complementary methods are also provided that bolster the solution’s 
applicability to connected cities and other implementation opportunities. 
8
Johnston et al.: ENSURING TRUSTWORTHINESS OF INCIDENT EVIDENCE DATA GENERATED BY T
Published by Technical Disclosure Commons, 2018
